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Abstract—Smartphones are becoming more significant in storing and transferring data. However, techniques ensuring this data is
not compromised after a confiscation of the device are not readily available. DroidStealth is an open source Android application
which combines data encryption and application obfuscation techniques to provide users with a way to securely hide content on their
smartphones. This includes hiding the application’s default launch methods and providing methods such as dial-to-launch or invisible
launch buttons. A novel technique provided by DroidStealth is the ability to transform its appearance to be able to hide in plain sight on
devices. To achieve this, it uses self-compilation, without requiring any special permissions. This Two-Layer protection aims to protect
the user and its data from casual search in various situations.
Index Terms—casual search, privacy, nomadic software, data obfuscation, data encryption
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1 INTRODUCTION
Using encryption technology on your smartphone may
raise suspicion. We present a tool which goes beyond
encrypting sensitive data: It obfuscates the data, and
itself.
There are over 1.5 billion smartphone users all over the
world[1], and over 80% of the population in developed
nations have mobile broadband subscriptions [2]. A large
percentage of this population captures their daily life
on their phone. For many, a large part of this data is
personal and is something they want to keep private.
A large part of the Android security model is built
around preventing attackers from unlocking the device.
Once unlocked, either through forceful user cooperation
or other means, a large part of the data becomes acces-
sible. This gives a reason to actively encrypt and hide
data from watchful eyes.
One such situation arose during the Arab Spring.
It became clear that such sensitive data, stored on
smartphones, can have a significant impact [3]. Smart-
phone users provided on-the-ground information of the
protests and government reactions through various so-
cial media platforms. As such, these platforms get closely
monitored or even blocked by some governments [4].
Because of this, spreading content directly from phone to
phone has become a popular approach in places where
conventional platforms are either locked down or un-
der close surveillance. However, this means that people
carry sensitive material with them, posing the risk that
the data will still be compromised. Governments such
as Iran have even ordered citizens to hand over their
devices and log in on their accounts [5].
It is obviously a necessity to be able to hide data
until it can be shared in a safe manner. In this paper
we will explore data hiding on smartphones and present
DroidStealth, a solution aiming to protect against casual
smartphone searches.
2 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
As described, there is a need for a tool to hide sensi-
tive data, where encryption alone does not suffice. To
understand and properly describe the problem we have
studied the variables involved, and defined them below.
2.1 Audience
The audience of the application is broadly defined.
DroidStealth’s inspiration originates from the ‘citizen
journalism’[6] that played a significant role in the Arab
Spring. Based on this, people dealing with an oppressive
society was chosen as a worst case scenario. However
anyone interested in hiding and securing data on their
device is part of the target audience for this application.
2.2 Casual Search
We aim to protect against casual search. In the scope
of this article, we define ‘casual search’ as follows: "A
quick attempt to find information on a mobile device
without applying advanced technical knowledge of the
device, nor specific knowledge of the protecting methods
proposed and implemented as described in this article".
Someone applying a casual search will be called a casual
inspector, or casual searcher. This reasoning also assumes
that casual search is the most used search method: A
‘quick glance’ through a mobile device is more likely
to occur than a thorough investigation of the device by
someone who is experienced and trained where to look.
This would be time consuming and hard to manage on
a larger scale.
2.3 Beyond Simple Encryption
An obvious solution to keep data safe from inspection
by the wrong audience is encrypting the data. Using a
secure encryption has two useful properties: First, the
data would become inaccessible to any inspector. Sec-
ond, the encryption would render the files unreadable
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and unrecognizable to a human inspector, thus making
them less incriminating.
However, finding inaccessible data can be a reason
to extend a casual search with more intensive search
methods, in which case the data might be compromised
after all. The same applies to the application that holds
the data; any restriction to opening an application can
be seen as suspicious. To address both issues, the appli-
cation should not only obfuscate the data, but the tool
itself as well.
In this article, we will use the term ‘locked data’
to refer to encrypted, inaccessible data. With ‘locked
application’ we mean the application with its access
restriction, as we will explain in Section 3.
2.4 Root Permissions
We assume that users do not have root access on their
phones. ‘Rooting’ an Android device unlocks admin-
istrative privileges, allowing the user or applications
to access restricted files, and communicate with device
features more directly. By doing this, it undermines
Android’s security model[7].
It can be compared with root access as in Unix sys-
tems, and Administrator privileges in Windows systems.
Because ‘root access’ allows manipulating system files,
it provides more powerful tools that could benefit the
solution to the problem addressed.
Enabling root access is a technical challenge, and has
significant disadvantages for the user. Therefore, Droid-
Stealth does not require root access, and is therefore
restricted from using its privileges.
2.5 Spreading the application without a central app
store
In situations where a central distributor of applications,
app store, is monitored and censored distribution of the
application can prove difficult. These stores can easily
be inspected for installed applications, for which there
is no way of circumventing, since it is the primary
way to distribute these applications. A simple search in
Android’s Play Store would be sufficient to expose the
presence of the application, a risk many users would
not be willing to take. Not placing DroidStealth in
the Play Store would prevent this problem, but makes
distributing the application difficult.
A way of circumventing this limitation on distribution
would be a ‘nomadic’ distribution method for the appli-
cation. Instead of providing the application through a
central point that can be monitored, the users should be
able to share it directly with those interested.
2.6 Data Type Restrictions
The sensitive data that the user wants to keep safe can
take many forms. The data managed in DroidStealth
will likely consist mostly of photos and videos, with
the occasional document. However, we cannot predict
exactly what data the user would want to hide in the
application. Therefore, the application should support
the file types that the device could normally handle,
since we do not want to restrict the user to certain file
types.
3 APPROACH
Our solution combines password encryption and hiding
of the DroidStealth tool itself.
3.1 Password encryption
The first layer of protection offered by DroidStealth is
access restriction. This restriction consists of two parts,
one for the data itself and one for the application.
All data within DroidStealth is encrypted by default.
When the user adds a file to be managed by the ap-
plication, it is automatically removed from its original
location, encrypted, and added to a dedicated data
folder. This way, the data cannot be accessed by another
application, and restricts users to opening these files
exclusively through DroidStealth. Even when the user
wants to open an arbitrary file managed by DroidStealth,
the conscious step of decrypting the file must be made
first, raising awareness of the risk of exposure.
Every launch of the application requires the user to
enter a pin code, which the user defines the first time
DroidStealth is opened. Only by entering this pin code
upon launch can the user access the files managed by
DroidStealth. Should it be forgotten, the data in the
application will remain encrypted forever.
3.2 Hiding of DroidStealth
Finding encrypted and inaccessible data or applications
can raise suspicion towards the user. Since simply en-
crypting the data is not enough, our approach provides
an added step of obfuscation that increases security
of the data: DroidStealth hides itself. This combination
provides the two-layered protection, which is the key
solution implemented in DroidStealth.
With the purpose of hiding all incriminating aspects
of the encrypted data, we apply two ways of hid-
ing DroidStealth on the device: Providing alternative
launching methods, and ‘hiding the application in plain
sight’ by changing DroidStealth’s appearance. The first
is employed if the user wants to hide DroidStealth
from easy access on Android devices, while changing its
appearance allows for easy access as well as protection
from casual search.
3.2.1 Alternative Launch Methods
The default way of launching an application on an An-
droid device is through the ‘app drawer’. This overview
of all installed applications would normally show the
DroidStealth logo, and provide a way of opening it. The
application would then be visible to anyone browsing
the app drawer, including a casual inspector.
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It is possible to hide the application from this drawer,
but the user still needs to be able to launch DroidStealth
when it is hidden. For this, we have implemented two
alternative launching methods, which can be enabled by
the user in the application.
Dialer Launch DroidStealth provides a launch option
that opens the application by dialing a user-defined
numeric sequence. The user enters this numeric sequence
in the any regular phone number dialing application, as
it would with a phone number. Instead of actually calling
the number, the application launches, requesting the pin
code. Furthermore, DroidStealth fully intercepts the call,
making sure the number never gets added to the call
log.
Transparent Widget Another option is to launch the
app by means of an invisible widget on the device’s
home screen. This widget takes the form of a transparent
area, thus showing the background image, positioned
on the home screen by the user. When the widget
area is tapped once or twice, it remains inactive and
simply appears to be an empty area. However, when
the widget is tapped five times consecutively, it launches
DroidStealth.
When first created, this widget is temporarily visible,
to help the user in placing it and to remember the
location of the widget. After the first time the widget is
tapped, it becomes transparent. A comparison of these
two states of the widget is shown in figure 1.
When adding a new access widget, all previously
placed widgets become visible. This allows the user to
retrieve forgotten widgets.
3.2.2 Morphing: Mimicking Other Applications
DroidStealth is capable of transforming itself, changing
the application’s icon and name. DroidStealth can then
create an Android Application Package from which the
application can be (re-)installed with the new appear-
ance. When composing its new appearance, DroidStealth
provides all installed applications on the device. The
user can therefore both supply its own name and icon,
but it can also select an application it wants to mimic.
With the newly acquired appearance, DroidStealth
does not need to be hidden from the app drawer and
no secret launch methods are required. This way, the
intuitive ‘default’ launching method is retained, while
DroidStealth is still hidden from a casual inspector.
3.3 Distribution
As mentioned in Section 2.5, having DroidStealth in a
centralized store would result in a possible exposure
threat. For this reason, it was decided to let DroidStealth
distribute itself nomadically. This does introduce some
problems, most prominently the fact that users now need
to enable ‘side-loading’. Side-loading means enabling the
installing of ‘untrustworthy’ applications which came
from outside the Android Play Store. While this is a
minor inconvenience, it was deemed less important that
the visibility that comes from being in the Play Store.
Figure 1. A screenshot of the Android home screen
containing a visible (top half) and an invisible (bottom
half) DroidStealth Launch widget over a star-ridden back-
ground image.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
This section diverges on the technical details of the
implementation of DroidStealth. It explains our solu-
tions to challenges we encountered in the morphing
and encryption. Challenges and implementation deci-
sions regarding the user experience are discussed, and
finally an analysis of the vulnerabilities of DroidStealth
is addressed.
4.1 Morphing
As described in section 3, to hide the application some
way is needed to alter the appearance of the application
so that it can be hidden from casual search. To achieve
a complete change of appearance for an application
in the app drawer, both its icon and its name need
to be changed. However, to explain the full approach,
some background on the inner workings of Android
application packages might be required.
Android uses its own naming for its packages, so
called Android Packages, or ‘.apk’ files. In reality, these
files are very similar to Java archives – so called ‘.jar’
files – namely that they are both archives containing
binaries and resources. To construct an apk file, one first
needs the Dalvik binaries and the resources (images,
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animations and layouts among other things), which
can then be compressed into an archive. Optionally,
the archive can be zipaligned, which improves its read
performance by reordering the contents of the package
as to optimize it for Android devices. Once the archive
has been constructed, it only needs to be signed with an
appropriate key for the Android system to accept it as a
valid package.
For the morphing to be successful, this process needed
to be reversed, and then repeated after altering the
archive resources. For this, the original package is re-
quired. Fortunately, Android allows access to the original
package from within the application without root access
(see section 2 for an explanation about what root access
means). Reversing of the package construction process,
extraction of the files, can be achieved through normal
zip extraction, something which is included by default
in the Java version used for Android. Once the files have
been extracted, the application resources can be altered.
Due to the engineering effort of fully recompiling the
binaries on an Android device, only support for initial
self-compiling of the package was implemented. Further
self-compilation, namely the decompilation, editing, and
recompiling of the Dalvik binaries was considered be-
yond the scope of this work.
As explained earlier, both the application icon and the
application name need to be altered to have a successful
morphed application. To alter the icons, first the original
icon name that is stored in the resources is extracted from
the application info, something which Android provides
through its API. Then it is a matter of iterating over
the extracted content to find the appropriate icon files
– Android allows for multiple resolutions of the same
image to be stored – and replace them with the user spec-
ified icon. Once the icons have been replaced, the name
of the application needs to be changed. Unfortunately,
this is where the first restriction imposed by Android is
encountered.
Android uses a resource map where each resource
item gets mapped to a unique id generated by the
compiler, which allows for easy re-use of resources in
the making of an application. This does pose an obstacle,
since these reference maps are compiled into a binary
format which is difficult to alter. There is a solution
available for desktop environments[8], but it relies on
Android’s Package Tool, ‘AAPT’. Porting AAPT to An-
droid proved to be near impossible due to its system re-
quirements, which meant that decompiling the Android
resources would not be a feasible approach. Fortunately,
the name of the application is accessed through a file
known as the Android Manifest, which contains general
information about the application package. This manifest
proved to be slightly more process-able from within
the confinements of Android. This meant that the new
application name could be put directly into the manifest,
without having to rely on the decompiling of Android
resources. After these two steps of altering the applica-
tion appearance, the contents can be reconstructed again
into a valid Android Package.
The first step is rebuilding the archive. Since it is
structurally the same as a Java Archive, existing tools
could be used. For this, the JarBuilder by Dominik
Werthmueller[9] was used, since it posed the least
amount of dependencies, which is favorable when work-
ing with Android, which can be rather picky about what
parts of Java are actually supported in its system. This
resulted in a complete archive, which still needed to be
zipaligned and signed with an appropriate key. Because
of similar restrictions posed by the decompiling of the
Android resources, it was decided that including zip
alignment was not achievable for now.
Finally, the package needs to be signed. Fortunately,
an existing standalone solution is available outside
the default Android signing methods, the ‘zip-signer’
library[10]. However, a signing key still needs to be
chosen. For the scope of this project, it was decided the
test key would be sufficient, since actually signing it with
appropriate keys which would needed to be tracked to
prevent falsification of the application provide several
challenges which will be discussed in section 5.2.
Once the archive has been signed the morphing has
been completed. The user can now be presented with an
application package which contains the original appli-
cation, albeit with a new appearance, according to the
user’s preferences. This application can then be shared
with other users.
4.2 The Encryption Service
DroidStealth uses a ‘Service’1 for the encryption of files.
This service runs in the background, and listens for
Intents started by the application. A queue is used
to order the requests, and the service running in the
backgrounds works through the queue continuously.
The encryption that DroidStealth provides is imple-
mented using Facebook’s Conceal API[11]. Conceal pro-
vides a set of APIs for data encryption and authentica-
tion; we only use the first. The Conceal library does not
implement cryptography algorithms, but instead uses
algorithms used in OpenSSL[12].
Files are encrypted individually. When encryption
would be applied at folder level, the application would
have to decrypt all data upon being opened. Not only
does this expose all data during the user’s interaction
with (most likely) only one of the files; but if the user
would then forget to lock the data, all data managed
by DroidStealth would remain exposed. By applying
per-file encryption, the risk of exposure is kept to a
minimum. Only loading files when needed also means
an increase in startup time, as it is not necessary to
decrypt the entire folder.
The process of encrypting an unencrypted file is quite
simple because of the use of the Conceal API: The
Crypto class, provided by the Conceal API, handles
1. An Android Service is a part of an application that runs in the
background, often used for more intensive or lengthy executions.
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all encryption logic in the process. A ‘plain’ Java input
stream is created from the unencrypted file, and the
Crypto class provides an output stream that encrypts
data as it is being passed through. When both streams
have been created, a dedicated algorithm copies the data,
buffered in chunks of 4096 bytes, from the unencrypted
file’s input stream to the encrypting output stream. The
final result is, as expected, the encrypted version of the
previously unencrypted file. The decryption process uses
the exact opposite method: An input stream provided
by the Crypto class provides the decryption logic, by
which the encrypted file is read. The output of that
stream is passed to a plain Java output stream, which
writes the data to a new, unencrypted file.
The files are then stored in a folder outside the appli-
cation folder. To allow the updating of the application
without data loss, this separation is required; overwrit-
ing the application folder may be required, especially
when installing a morphed version of DroidStealth. This
means that the folder storing the files is public; other
applications, as well as the user, can find it on their
device via a computer or with a file explorer app. The
risk posed by this is migitated by the encryption of the
files, as well as the requirement to know of DroidStealth,
transcending the scope of ‘casual search’.
We see the above morphing procedure as the first
minimal form of self-compilation for an application.
4.3 User Experience
Within this subsection we will elaborate on our design
choices in user experience design related to locking and
hiding of both data and the app. We also briefly discuss
the philosophy behind the styling.
Once the application has been opened, the user can
interact with the files managed by DroidStealth. Destroy-
ing an encrypted file is allowed, but opening and export-
ing/sharing files is not; the user will have to decrypt
them first. This extra step is part of the interaction to
make the user aware that the files are then decrypted.
To add to this awareness, a warning is shown to the
user, explaining that some files are unlocked and pose
an exposure risk. This warning is shown as a persistent
notification in the notification drawer of the Android
device (see Figure 3. When the notification is pressed,
all unlocked files are immediately locked. This provides
a user friendly way to swiftly encrypt the files so they
cannot be found, without the need to reopen the app.
Figure 3. A non-disclosing notification to remind the user
to lock accessible files.
Depending on the file size, encrypting or decrypting
a file could take up to several minutes. During this
process, a notification which informs the user of the
Figure 2. The content gallery showing files in locked
(green), unlocked (red) and currently processed (yellow)
files. The upper-left corner shows the notification icons
informing the user that files are being processed, and that
other files are unlocked, respec
encryption or decryption process. Once the user taps on
it, the encryption or decryption is canceled by emptying
the queue and finishing the current task.
4.3.1 Launching DroidStealth
The trivial, default way of launching DroidStealth is
through the app drawer of an Android device. When
launching the application the first time, the user is
prompted to enter a pin that will be used to access
the application. On following launches, the app will
present the user with a numeric keyboard to enter its
pin code (see Figure 4 . If the pin is entered correctly,
the DroidStealth will launch into the content gallery, as
shown in Figure 2. This pin code is required to open
the application trough any launch method. If the user
forgets the pin code, the data in the application will
remain encrypted forever.
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Figure 4. The numerical keyboard presented to the user
upon launching DroidStealth.
Alternative Launch Methods As explained in Sec-
tion 3, DroidStealth provides alternative launch meth-
ods. The application provides a ‘Launch Menu’ where
launch methods can be enabled and disabled. To protect
the user from not being able to open the application, at
least one launch method must be enabled at all times.
When the user adds a DroidStealth launch widget to
the device’s home screen, the new widget and all existing
widgets are made temporarily visible. This helps the user
to place the new widget, as well as retrieve existing (lost)
widget locations. Touching any of the widgets will make
all of them transparent again, and therefore invisible
to the human eye. From that point on, when the user
presses the invisible widget 5 times, the app is launched,
showing the pin keyboard.
4.4 Styling
DroidStealth is themed with a dark color in order to give
users the feeling that they are indeed working in secret,
and that their data will be safely hidden. To give Droid-
Stealth a professional ambience, we used a rounded but
solid straight font for our titles, and a formal font for
all other texts. Combining this with the use of bright,
but slightly softened primary and secondary colors, the
user is provided with a balanced and consistent user
interface.
The use of green and red is mirrored from the con-
ventional meaning of those colors. Green will always be
used to indicate that something is good or safe, red will
do the opposite. Furthermore, we use the color orange
when indicating a process is being executed. Whenever
a file is locking, or unlocking, the status bar of the file
will be orange, and a animated twirl is shown to indicate
that the file is being processed.
Finally, the gallery uses no padding or margins be-
tween the thumbnails of files, as we want to optimally
make use of all the screen space. Thumbnails are thus
as big as they can be, and thus will be most efficient in
showing the user its contents.
4.5 Vulnerability Analysis
DroidStealth has some vulnerabilities, which are ana-
lyzed here. Per vulnerability, we explain how it poses
a risk, how big the risk is, and if applicable how this
could be solved.
4.5.1 Unlocked Files
A potential security threat that can be exploited, is that
unlocked files are stored on the internal SD card of the
device, and that another app could constantly watch the
folders in which those files would be decrypted. Then
this other app could save them somewhere else or send
them over the Internet.
Also, if files are unlocked, and the user’s device is
taken from its rightful owner without warning, then the
user might not have gotten enough time to press the
notifications to swiftly lock the secret files back. Invaders
won’t be able to see the data directly, unless they launch
a file browser and start searching, but they would be
informed of the existence of secret files. This could be a
potential danger, because an attacker could be interested
in those files and do the user harm to get these files.
Users should be fully aware that they should only unlock
files if they are 100% sure that they are in a safe location.
4.5.2 Application visibility
While it’s possible to hide DroidStealth from the app
drawer, or even change its appearance, there are still
several ways its presence can be determined. The most
direct one would be to access the list of installed ap-
plications through the device settings. While it might
take an attacker some time if DroidStealth is morphed, it
would be possible to use this list to discover it through
its package name, which doesn’t change at this point.
More thorough search would make use of the ‘adb’
tool, which can be used to communicate with authorized
Android devices. For this, enabling ‘USB Debugging’ in
Android’s settings, physically connecting the device to a
computer and allowing it access to the device is needed.
While this is be a possible scenario, it makes several
changes to the security settings of the device (allowing
external devices to access it), meaning it is considered
out of the scope of ‘casual search’ for this work.
4.6 Spreading DroidStealth
As expressed in the section 2, the application should be
able to be spread nomadically. This means there is no
central distribution point, but users share the application
between each other.
Spreading the application is possible through a mul-
titude of ways on Android, via all standard file sharing
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methods. These methods include sending the application
package through, for example, email, MMS, and Blue-
Tooth. DroidStealth also supports sharing via a more
recently provided feature called Near Field Communi-
cation (NFC)[13]. When available on the device, it uses
Android’s NFC sharing feature called Android Beam to
transfer the application to another device when it is held
adjacent to the sending device.
These spreading methods allow the users to share
DroidStealth directly from device to device, eliminating
a central distribution point.
4.7 Open Source
This application was written as an open source project.
The code can be found on GitHub[14], and may be
used under terms of the licenses provided there. The
source code of this application is provided, as well as a
separately usable library that can be used to include the
morphing feature into another Android application.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
DroidStealth beats casual search by combining encryp-
tion and the tool‘s self-obfuscating approach.
There are several aspects of the application that can
be improved. Which can be categorized under one of
the following: usability, and morphing. The categories
will be discussed individually as they are separated both
technically and conceptually.
5.1 Usability
In terms of usability there has been no formal study
on what aspects of the application work work well.
However, informal testing has shown several avenues
of improvement.
The testing has shown that the alternative launch
methods could use closer attention when it comes to the
usability. The counter-intuitive approaches to launching
DroidStealth can be confusing. There is also a risk that
the methods, or the codes are forgotten when the user
only sporadically opens the app; This would render the
data managed by the application lost forever.
With the providing of alternative access methods,
easier access is provided to both the users and possible
attackers. The invisible widget that is provided is easily
found in the widget list, though it is made more complex
to detect when used in combination with a morphed
DroidStealth. The dialer launcher poses a risk when a
user fills in the wrong launch code, as the entry won’t
be removed from the call log, and thus an attacked could
be hinted towards the right pin. Also, if a user had made
more mistakes, the attacker could merge the suspicious
call log entries, and deduct the correct pin. A possible
solution would be to check the call log for entries that
are similar to the actual one, and to remove those as well.
Future work could address this issue with a solution that
creates a more usable alternative launch method, while
maintaining the security of the application.
Once the application has been launched, the user
is required to pay close attention to the state of the
application, and the state of the files managed by it.
A small human error can result in inadvertent data
breaches, especially when the data in the application is
opened in other apps.
Monitoring the application’s life-cycle more closely
could resolve some of these issues: For example, ‘listen-
ing’ to home button presses could be used to trigger
the locking of files automatically whenever the app gets
out of focus. Another solution that has been discussed
is limiting the time during which a file may be un-
locked, which could restore the encryption after a (user-
)designated duration.
5.2 Morphing
The basic features of the morphing library have been
implemented, however it is not without limitations. Two
areas of improvement have been identified, namely app
renaming restrictions and the lack of integrity verifica-
tion.
Application names applied in the morphing process
have to be the same length or shorter than the name
originally given to the application. Preliminary research
indicates that this limitation can be overcome but not all
details of packaged Android manifests have been reverse
engineered. Alternatively increased support for self-
compilation could remove this limitation, as it would
allow all details of the manifest to be changed as it would
be done prior to compilation.
Integrity validation is not included in morphing. With
integrity validation we mean that the actual code itself
is not modified to change the behaviour of DroidStealth,
for example introducing a backdoor. Normally this is
something that the Android package system takes care
of, but morphing has unique demands that makes it
impossible to rely on built-in measures. These measures
rely on using a private key for signing the code, however
to allow updating for the application after morphing the
private key has to be bundled with the software so it
can be signed again. With access to this key anyone can
create a modified version of the morphed application
and spread that as an ‘update’. Solving this problem is
non-trivial and requires more research.
Other future work on the morphing, as mentioned
in Section 4.1, would be a fully self-compiling system.
Getting this to work would mean at least porting the
‘aapt’ and ‘dex’ tools provided by Google for construc-
tion of packages and binaries. Using existing systems
on desktops, like ApkTool [8], should provide a good
starting point for anyone interested in continuing this
work.
5.3 Re-installing the application
When the application is re-installed from, for example,
a morphed android application package, the encryption
DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY STUDENT PROJECT 8
key used to lock data is replaced. This means that the
data locked before the re-installation is impossible to
decrypt; a significant limitation in the usability.
A method of deriving a key that is consistent through
re-installing the application is required, while it remains
underivable for external parties.
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